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HE duty owed a tort plaintiff is an ever-changing concept, constantly
developing to meet society's expectations.' Cases involving duty de-
cided during the Survey period were no exception to the precept, and
several merit closer attention. El Chico Corp. v. Poole 2 and Joleemo, Inc. v.
Evans 3 are two prime examples of the evolution of duty within the State of
Texas. These two cases, consolidated on appeal to the Texas Supreme
Court,4 moved Texas into the majority of states with regard to the duty
owed by alcoholic beverage licensees. 5 In each case the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death and survival action against a bar for serving alcoholic bever-
ages to intoxicated persons later involved in automobile accidents. The
supreme court affirmed both courts of appeals' opinions, holding that a duty
existed not to sell alcoholic beverages to persons known, or who should be
known, to be intoxicated. 6 In determining that this duty existed the court
first focused on the element of foreseeability of the risk. The court held that
the risk was foreseeable based upon the common knowledge of the effects of
alcohol on automobile drivers. 7 Given the court's concern with the number
of alcohol-induced motor vehicle accidents, the court had no difficulty recog-
nizing a common law duty to act reasonably under the circumstances and
avoid selling alcohol to obviously intoxicated persons.8 Further, a statutory
* B.A. Texas Christian University; J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. Kilgarlin & Sterba-Boatwright, The Recent Evolution of Duty in Texas, 28 S. TEX.
L.J. 241, 245 (1986).
2. 713 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), aff'd, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.
1987).
3. 714 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986), aff'd, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.
1987).
4. 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987). For a further discussion of the courts of appeals opin-
ions, see Branson, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Personal Torts, 41 Sw. L.J. 83, 83 (1987).
5. The court reserved the question of whether a social host could be liable under the
same circumstances. 732 S.W.2d at 309.
6. Id. at 314.
7. Id. The court relied upon TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, A LOOK AT
DWI ... ACCIDENTS, VICTIMS, ARRESTS 1-4 (1985), indicating that intoxicated drivers were
involved in over 30,000 motor vehicle accidents within the State of Texas, killing 989 persons
and wounding 25,000 more. 732 S.W.2d at 311.
8. 732 S.W.2d at 311.
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duty exists that requires alcoholic beverage licensees to refrain from serving
intoxicated persons.9 Guided by the public policy enunciated in the Alco-
holic Beverage Code, 10 the court interpreted the statute as implying a duty
not knowingly to sell alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons and al-
lowing civil liability for breach of the duty.'1 The court remanded both
cases for determination of proximate cause. 12
Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 13 held that a party undertaking a duty on
behalf of another must reasonably perform that duty.14 Travelers Indemnity
Company insured the boilers at the Gaston Episcopal Hospital and em-
ployed authorized inspectors (insurance personnel commissioned by the
state) who inspected and certified the hospital's boilers. Scalding water that
spewed from one of the recently certified boilers fatally injured Jack Seay, a
maintenance worker at the hospital. The Dallas court of appeals applied the
Restatement (Second) of Torts15 to impose a duty on Travelers to exercise
reasonable care when inspecting the boilers.S6
Howell v. City Towing Associates, Inc. 17 held that tow truck drivers owe a
duty to their passengers. 18 City Towing Associates created a special rela-
tionship with Mr. Howell by giving him a ride home while delivering his
wrecked car. Mr. Howell suffered a heart attack while in the tow truck.
Instead of driving two blocks to the hospital, the tow truck driver called his
dispatcher to report the emergency and waited for emergency personnel to
reach him. Mr. Howell's widow brought suit alleging that City Towing ac-
ted negligently by failing to provide immediate transportation to the nearby
hospital. Finding that the "good samaritan" statute' 9 did not shield the
9. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 101.63(a) (Vernon 1978). The Code states, "A per-
son commits an offense if he knowingly sells an alcoholic beverage to an habitual drunkard or
an intoxicated or insane person." Id.
10. Id.
11. 732 S.W.2d at 314.
12. Id. at 315. In the El Chico case the court also remanded for a determination of negli-
gence. While the dram shop was negligent per se in Joleemo, the court required a factual
determination in El Chico as to whether the employees of the tavern sold alcohol to a person
when they knew, or should have known, of that person's intoxication.
13. 730 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
14. Id. at 776.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). Recognizing that no Texas court
explicitly adopted § 324A, the court found that Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex. 461, 473-75,
240 S.W. 517, 520-21 (1922), subscribed to the ruling underlying the Restatement position.
16. 730 S.W.2d at 776.
17. 717 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. Id at 733-34.
19. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001 (Vernon 1986). The statute states:
(a) A person who in good faith administers emergency care at the scene of an
emergency or in a hospital is not liable in civil damages for an act performed
during the emergency unless the act is wilfully or wantonly negligent.
(b) The section does not apply to care administered:
(1) for or in expectation of remuneration;
(2) by a person who was at the scene of the emergency because he or a
person he represents as an agent was soliciting business or seeking to per-
form a service for remuneration;




trucking company from liability, the court held that the special relationship
between a towing company and its customer gave rise to a duty to aid ill
customers.
20
Two other court of appeals cases marked the outer boundary of Texas
duty development. Hendricks v. Todora 21 used the Restatement (Second) of
Torts22 to hold that a tavern owner owes no duty to protect customers from
the reckless criminal acts of third persons. Tony Hendricks was injured
when an automobile crashed through a glass wall of the entrance area of
Todora's bar and restaurant. Tracking the Restatement, the Dallas court
held that though Todora may have realized the possibility that an intoxi-
cated person could drive off the parking lot and into the restaurant, the risk
of that occurrence was so low that a reasonable person would disregard it.23
Further, the court found that requiring Todora to erect barriers around the
entrance ways, or to erect warning signs for the waiting patrons, would not
be reasonable. 24 Similarly, the court in Corpus v. K-J Oil Co. 25 refused to
impose a duty on an oil well owner to warn independent contractors of the
dangerous condition of the premises. K-J Oil Co. hired Cox Oil Well Ser-
vice to pull pipe and other underground equipment from the oil well. The
Cox crew included Pablo Corpus. A K-J employee parked near the rig to
watch the Cox crew perform its duties. Pablo Corpus touched the metal
portions of the rig when another Cox employee touched the rig's boom to
several overhead electrical wires. The Austin court held that the K-J em-
ployee's presence did nothing to alter Cox's independent contractor status
because K-J did not exercise control over Cox's work. 26 In addition, only
exceptional circumstances can create a duty to warn independent contrac-
tors of dangers arising from the performance of their work, and the plainly
visible electrical wires foreclosed any special circumstances.2 7
(4) by an admitting physician of the patient bringing a health-care liabil-
ity claim.
Id.
20. 717 S.W.2d at 733. Like the Dallas court in Seay, the San Antonio court relied upon
the Restatement (Second) of Torts to clarify the duty owed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A (1965) (special relationship between the parties may create a duty to protect
one against harm during the course of the special relationship).
21. 722 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The supreme court origi-
nally granted Hendrick's application for writ of error on points considering Todora's duty. 30
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 345 (Apr. 8, 1987). The court heard argument on May 6, 1987; two weeks
later the court withdrew the order granting the application for writ of error as improvidently
granted and refused the application, "no reversible error." 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 436 (May 20,
1987).
22. 722 S.W.2d at 461; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1956) ("[T]he risk
is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the
law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.").
23. 722 S.W.2d at 462.
24. Id.
25. 720 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. Id. at 674.
27. Id. at 675.
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B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was a significant topic in at least two
cases during the Survey period. The first of these, Porterfield v. Brinegar,28
arose out of a one-car accident. Lorene Brinegar was riding home in Walter
Williams's car when it ran off the road and rolled over, killing Williams and
injuring Brinegar. Brinegar, who was asleep at the time of the accident,
brought suit against Williams's estate for her injuries. The trial court in-
structed a verdict for the estate because Brinegar failed to demonstrate Wil-
liams's negligence.
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal, 29 applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The theory applied because no evidence existed
of any nonnegligent reason for the car to leave the road. All evidence
pointed to the fact that Williams fell asleep at the wheel. The traditional
factors of res ipsa loquitur 30 appeared in this case, raising some evidence of
Williams's negligence. The court held the instructed verdict improper and
remanded the case for trial. 31
In the second case, Conaway v. Roberts,32 the court applied res ipsa loqui-
tur to the situation in which Roberts, cutting her grass one morning, sud-
denly found herself pinned beneath her riding mower. Suit was brought by
her neighbor, Conaway, who sustained injuries while rescuing the helpless
Roberts. Testimony showed that Roberts remembered pointing the lawn
mower up a small incline and attempting to set the brake. She did not know
whether her foot slipped off the clutch, how she fell off the lawn mower, or
how she became trapped beneath the machine. Additionally, Roberts could
never explain why the lawn mower was found in reverse gear. Coupling
Robert's poor memory with an engineer's opinion that Roberts's foot proba-
bly slipped from the clutch, causing her to tumble off the back of the
machine, the court of appeals held that some evidence existed that Roberts's
actions constituted negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and
reversed the directed verdict. 33
C. Premises Liability
In Exxon Corp. v. Quinn 34 the supreme court found a leaseholder liable
for failing to provide a reasonably safe place for an independent contractor
to work. The court recognized that a leaseholder is under no duty to require
an independent contractor to perform on-premise activities in a safe man-
28. 719 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1986).
29. Brinegar v. Porterfield, 705 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ granted).
30. The factors generally include an accident that does not ordinarily occur absent negli-
gence and the defendant's maintaining control of the injury-causing instrument. Washington
v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 90 Tex. 314, 320, 38 S.W. 764, 765-66 (1897); P. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 39 (5th ed. 1984).
31. 719 S.W.2d at 560.
32. 725 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
33. Id. at 380.
34. 726 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1987).
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ner,35 but imposed a duty upon the leaseholder to provide safe premises for
the independent contractor. The facts of the case showed that Quinn
worked for Woodard Electric Company on Exxon's utility poles. Quinn's
job required him to climb an energized power pole and reach across several
electrified wires in order to perform his task. The typical procedure for
safely performing this operation is known as a red-tag procedure. 36 No one
followed the red-tag procedure in this instance. As a result, after Quinn had
performed his duties at the top of the pole and began descending, his fore-
man re-energized the area. The court found some evidence supporting the
jury's finding that Exxon acted negligently by having poorly designed poles
on its property. 37
In Amara v. Lain 38 the court of appeals held that an independent contrac-
tor may be liable for precariously stacking 1500 pounds of sheetrock in an
area frequented by children. 39 Rejecting the argument that the Restatement
(Second) of Torts shields independent contractors from liability for their
negligence, 4° the court found fact issues concerning the independent con-
tractor's knowledge that children played in and near the construction site.4 '
D. Negligent Entrustment
Two cases addressed the evidence necessary to show negligent entrust-
ment. Jacobini v. Hall42 dealt with both the legal and factual sufficiency of
evidence supporting a jury finding of negligent entrustment. The evidence
showed that Lewis Jacobini allowed a good friend and sometime-employee
35. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
36. During a red tag procedure the electric company would usually come out to the ener-
gized pole and disconnect the power. The electric company would then write the name of the
person who climbed the pole on a red tag and would not re-energize the pole until the em-
ployee completed the task and signed his name on the red tag.
37. 726 S.W.2d at 21. Chief Justice Hill, writing for a four-judge minority, stated that no
evidence supported the finding that Exxon was negligent. The dissent characterized the case as
involving the unforeseeable conduct of a third person (Quinn's foreman). As a result, the
dissent stated, Exxon did not proximately cause the accident and therefore should not have
been held liable. 726 S.W.2d at 22.
38. 725 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
39. Id. at 739.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 384 (1965) reads:
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition on the land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same
freedom from liability, as though he were the possessor of the land, for physical
harm caused to others upon and outside of the land by the dangerous character
of the structure or other condition while the work is in his charge.
Lain argued that under the Restatement he enjoyed the same freedom from liability as the
general contractor. Abalos v. Oil Dev. Co., 544 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1976), provides that the
general contractor is not liable for injuries caused by independent contractors. Id. at 631. The
duty not to injure third parties in that situation belongs to the subcontractor, not the general
contractor. Lain claimed immunity by coupling the Restatement view with the Abalos rule.
The Fort Worth court correctly recognized the circularity of this reasoning. Further, Lain's
argument ignored the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 339 (1934), concerning "Artificial Condi-
tions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children" first adopted in Banker v. McLaughlin, 146
Tex. 434, 446, 208 S.W.2d 843, 849-50 (1948).
41. 725 S.W.2d at 739.
42. 719 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
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to drive his truck. The friend/employee had no Texas driver's license and
had two previous convictions for driving while intoxicated. The court held
these facts sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence on Jacobini's
part.43 Parker v. Fox Vacuum, Inc. 44 concerned the admissibility of prior
convictions for driving while intoxicated in a negligent entrustment case.
The case was unusual in that no one disputed that the driver's intoxication
did not cause the accident giving rise to the lawsuit. The theory of negligent
entrustment, however, focuses on the driver's abilities not at the time of the
accident, but rather at the time of the entrustment. The court held the prior
convictions relevant and admissible to show that someone provided an in-
competent driver with a vehicle, regardless of whether the driver was drunk
at the time of the accident. 45 Further, the convictions shed light on the gross
negligence allegations, and thus the trial court erred in failing to admit the
testimony regarding convictions.46
E. Interspousal Immunity
Texas first recognized the doctrine of interspousal immunity in Nickerson
& Matson v. Nickerson 47 in 1886. The Survey period saw the doctrine elimi-
nated 101 years later. The Texas Supreme Court first considered the issue in
Stafford v. Stafford,48 but declined to reach the issue of interspousal immu-
nity because the party claiming immunity did not properly plead the doc-
trine as a defense in the trial court. The Stafford opinion thus did not pass
on the validity of the interspousal immunity doctrine. 49 Nevertheless, a con-
curring opinion by Justice Mauzy, joined by Justice Gonzalez, set the stage
for elimination of the immunity doctrine. 50
Price v. Price 51 presented the court's first clear opportunity to reach the
subject. The thesis of the doctrine began in the notion that a husband and
wife were one person. 2 This basis lost much of its support during the latter
half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, however,
when the Married Women Acts recognized wives as separate legal beings.5 3
After the collapse of the unity fiction, the justification for the interspousal
immunity doctrine shifted to the premise that allowing suits between hus-
bands and wives would lead to matrimonial strife or collusive lawsuits. 54
The court saw through both of these artifices and pointed out that denying a
43. Id. at 399.
44. 732 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. Id. at 723.
46. Id.
47. 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
48. 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987). The case involved an award of damages to a wife for a
venereal disease she contracted from her ex-husband.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 16-17.
51. 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987).
52. Id. (citing Firebrass v. Pennant, 2 Wils. 255, 256 (C.P. 1764)).
53. The Married Women Acts typically gave women the rights to acquire and dispose of
property, to contract, and to sue. For an examination of the Texas legislative acts, see 1913
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 32, at 61.
54. 732 S.W.2d at 317 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F, comment d
[Vol. 42
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forum for the redress of negligent acts probably does little to encourage do-
mestic peace. 55 As to collusive lawsuits, the adversary system appears well
equipped to ferret out and prevent such frauds without the use of a legal
fiction denying just compensation to injured victims. 56 Texas thus joined the
vast majority of jurisdictions in banishing this common law dinosaur.57
F. Special Issues
Luna v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. ,58 a personal injury suit, arose
out of a railroad grade-crossing collision. The jury found that the railroad
company, acting through its agents, servants, and employees negligently
failed to issue speed restrictions at the crossing in question. In response to
another issue, the jury failed to find that the train crew acted negligently
with respect to the speed of the train, but found negligence in the failure to
apply the brakes or reduce the throttle. Seeing a conflict between the finding
of negligence by the railroad company and the failure to find negligence on
the part of the train crew, the court of appeals reversed the jury verdict.5 9
The supreme court held that the findings could be harmonized since the first
issue asked about the company policy itself, while the second issue inquired
about the train crew's actions.60 The jury possibly failed to find the crew
negligent by speeding because the crew adhered to the company speed limit.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Duty
As with Texas negligence law, products liability theories saw major devel-
opments in the concept of duty. The leading case in this area, Aim v. Alumi-
num Co. of America,6 1 came about because of an exploding bottle cap.
During the 1960s the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) developed
a system for applying aluminum caps to carbonated soft drink bottles. JFW
Enterprises, Inc., the owner of the Houston 7-Up Bottling Company,
purchased an Alcoa capping machine and used it to apply Alcoa-designed
(1979)). These concurrent reasons seem rather contradictory; presumably a collusive family is
a happy family.
55. Id. at 318.
56. Id.; see also Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985), holding the auto-
guest statute unconstitutional. The stated rationale for the auto-guest immunity was the same
desire to avoid collusive lawsuits.
57. 732 S.W.2d at 319. The court cited thirty-eight other jurisdictions that have abolished
the immunity in whole or in part. Id. Justice Mauzy, in his concurring opinion, took the State
Board of Insurance to task for incorporating the interspousal immunity doctrine into a pre-
scribed automobile insurance policy. 732 S.W.2d at 320.
58. 724 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1987).
59. 707 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986), rev'd, 724 S.W.2d 383 (1987).
60. 724 S.W.2d at 384.
61. 717 S.W.2d 588.(Tex. 1986). For further discussion, see Note, Aim v. Aluminum
Company of America: An Extension of Duty to Warn, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 339 (1987). The
Idaho Supreme Court followed the Aim analysis in Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of America, 112
Idaho 277, 731 P.2d 1267, 1270 (1986).
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
pilfer-proof caps62 to the 7-Up bottles. JFW purchased the aluminum cap-
ping material from a manufacturer that produced the Alcoa-designed and
patented caps under a licensing agreement. On June 3, 1976, James Alm
was blinded by an aluminum cap that blew off a thirty-two ounce bottle of 7-
Up bottled and distributed by JFW Enterprises.
The principal issue addressed by the supreme court concerned Alcoa's
duty to warn consumers about the dangers of bottle-cap explosions. Alcoa
occupied a unique position regarding the bottle cap because it did not manu-
facture or sell any component part of the final defective product. The court
held that Alcoa, as the designer and marketer of the closure process, cap,
and capping machine, had a duty to warn consumers.6 A manufacturer has
long been held to have a duty to exercise ordinary care in the design of a
product. 64 As a number of cases in other states have held, a designer owes
the same duty even though he is not a manufacturer. 65
Costilla v. Aluminum Co. of America 66 followed the Alm teachings on a
manufacturer's ability to warn consumers through the use of a learned inter-
mediary. Costilla was another exploding cap case, but the case was tried
before Alm was handed down. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for trial
and required a jury instruction concerning Alcoa's ability to fulfill its duty to
warn through the use of a learned intermediary.6 7
The federal court also addressed a manufacturer's duty to warn in Osburn
v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc. 68 In Osburn a cowboy, Clois Osburn, was ex-
posed to the veterinary drug, chloramphenicol. Later he was diagnosed as
having leukemia. In 1982 Osburn began treating sick calves on the range,
administering the antibiotic drug manufactured by Anchor Laboratories and
Rachelle Laboratories. In order to administer the drug effectively, he strad-
dled the sick calf, inserted a syringe into the rubber lid containing the antibi-
otic, and injected the calf with a syringe full of the drug. The difficulty of the
process regularly resulted in the antibiotic's splashing and washing onto Os-
burn's hands and arms.69 In their appeal of the jury verdict in favor of Os-
burn, the chemical companies argued that they had discharged their duty to
warn Osburn by providing warnings through their learned intermediary, the
veterinarian. Since the antibiotic was a prescription drug, the laboratory ar-
gued that a proper warning to the prescribing physician satisfied their duty
to warn Osburn. The Fifth Circuit rejected this interpretation of Aim since
62. Pilfer-proof caps typically have a small band of aluminum attached to the bottom of
the cap itself.
63. 717 S.W.2d at 591.
64. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965); Olivarez v. Broadway
Hardware, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
65. See, e.g., Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Il. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584, 588
(1966); Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass. 372, 403 N.E.2d 391, 395 (1980); Totten v.
Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1, 5 (1968).
66. 826 F.2d 1444 (5th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 1448.
68. 825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987).
69. The evidence showed that Osborn's arms were usually bathed with the chlorampheni-
col by the time he was through administering the drug. Id. at 910. The testimony also showed
that he used more than sixty bottles of the antibiotic over an eighteen-month period. Id.
[Vol. 42
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the "mere presence" of a learned intermediary does not excuse a manufac-
turer's failure to warn the ultimate user.70 While the laboratories could ex-
pect the veterinarian to have expertise and knowledge concerning the
dangers of the antibiotic to animals, the court found it unreasonable to ex-
pect the dispensing veterinarian to warn about the risks of incidental
exposure.71
The drug companies also challenged the Osburn recovery on the grounds
that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,72 and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's regulations73 preempted the Osburn state common law tort claims
based upon the failure to warn. The drug companies contended that the
FDA labeling requirements that the antibiotic have an approved label on the
package conflicted with the state's duty to warn in a products case.74 The
Fifth Circuit rejected this false conflict between FDA labeling requirements
and state common law tort doctrines because the FDA regulations pertain-
ing to this veterinary product did not prescribe a specific label.75 Instead of
setting out a particular label, the FDA required the laboratories to submit a
proposed label, which it would then approve or reject. Further, federal regu-
lations specifically permitted the drug companies to add additional warnings
to previously approved labels as soon as the laboratory became aware of the
need for such warnings. Since the federal law did not prevent the drug com-
panies from using warning labels, there was no conflict between the federal
regulations and state common law, and hence no federal preemption.76
A contrasting case is Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories,77 in which the court
held that FDA requirements preempted Texas tort law concerning allegedly
defective whole-cell diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccines. The
district court in Hurley granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, finding evidence of congressional intent to supersede state common
law with regard to drug dispensing. 78 The court looked for both express and
implied preemption of the state cause of action. 79 Recognizing that no spe-
cific language in any of the relevant acts cut off the plaintiff's right to pro-
ceed under a state cause of action, the court found three factors in the
labeling acts that implied a preemption of the state cause of action. First,
federal labeling requirements are so comprehensive as to indicate an intent
70. Id. at 913.
71. Id.
72. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).
73. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.105, 514 (1987).
74. The preemption doctrine recognizes that since federal law is the "Supreme Law of the
Land," it supplants state laws on the same subject. In addition federal regulations have the
same amount of preemptive effect as federal statutes. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-54 (1982). A federal law's preemptive effect is not limited to state
statutes, but extends to common law as well. Chicago & North W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick
& Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 327 (1981).
75. 825 F.2d at 912.
76. Id. at 912-13.
77. 651 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
78. Id. at 1000.




to occupy the field and preclude any state regulation. Second, the nature of
the DPT labeling requires exclusive federal jurisdiction in order to achieve a
uniformity vital to national interests. Finally, state regulation of labeling or
warning requirements would seriously and irreconcilably conflict with the
federal statutory and regulatory scheme in this area.80 The court held that,
as a matter of law, the warning given to the learned intermediary was
adequate. 81
B. Defenses
Defenses to a product liability action was the subject of Magro v. Ragsdale
Brothers, Inc. 82 Lewis Magro sued the manufacturer of a beer can making
machine for failing to warn him of the dangers involved in cleaning the
machine. Magro's job required him to reach into the machine's internal
workings and clean the tool-pack. Although the machine usually stopped
automatically when Magro opened a small access door, a co-worker defeated
this safety device by restarting the machine, severely injuring Magro.
Accepting that the manufacturer gave no adequate warning or instruction
concerning the safe cleaning of the machine, the question was whether this
failure to warn proximately caused Magro's injuries. Relying upon Techni-
cal Chemical Co. v. Jacobs,83 the court ruled that when the Ragsdale Broth-
ers failed to give adequate warnings or instructions, it created a presumption
that the co-worker would read and heed the sign, satisfying the proximate
cause requirement.84
Another issue in the case concerned whether the Duncan v. Cessna 85
formula for determining the liability of settling defendants required submis-
sion of an issue inquiring about the co-worker's negligence. The court of
appeals remanded the case with an instruction to the trial court requiring an
issue on the co-worker's negligence. 86 Reversing that decision, the supreme
court relied upon Varela v. American Petrofina Co. 87 in holding that the
workers' compensation statute creates an exception to former article 2212a 88
so that a negligent co-worker is not treated as a settling defendant for con-
tributory negligence purposes.89
80. Id. at 998-1001. The court also found that federal regulations concerning the design
of DTP vaccines also preempted state regulation in that area. Id. at 1003. For further discus-
sion of factors implying preemption of a state cause of action, see KVUE, Inc. v. Austin
Broadcasting Corp., 709 F.2d 922, 931-32 (5th Cir 1983), aff'd sub nom. Texas v. KVUE, Inc.,
465 U.S. 1092 (1984); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1143-47 (8th
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
81. 651 F. Supp. at 1002.
82. 721 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1986).
83. 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
84. 721 S.W.2d at 834-35.
85. 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 n.8 (Tex. 1984).
86. 693 S.W.2d 530, 543 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985), rev'd, 721 S.W.2d 832 (1986).
87. 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983).
88. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (repealed 1985), recodified at TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
89. 721 S.W.2d at 835-36.
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Two other cases, Short v. Black & Decker, Inc. 90 and Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Cropper, 91 represent examples of courts of appeals' treatment of de-
fenses to products liability suits. In Short the court found evidence support-
ing an implied jury finding that a worker who knew of and realized the grave
dangers involved in working with an ungrounded impact wrench 92 acted
negligently.93 While Short upheld a jury finding of contributory negligence,
Caterpillar Tractor reversed the trial court judgment because the jury re-
fused to find contributory negligence on the part of an experienced truck
driver who suffered an injury when his vehicle ran over an obstruction. The
Texarkana court concluded that the jury's finding that the driver did not act
negligently was so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to be mani-
festly unjust.94 The failure of the driver to look around the vision-blocking
portions of his truck, failure to utilize alternative driving methods, and in
fact accelerating near the obstruction constituted sufficient grounds to re-
quire a new trial on the issue. 95
Placencio v. Allied Industrial International, Inc. 96 involved the proper
method of submitting a product misuse defense to the jury. The misuse issue
contained in the Texas Pattern Jury Charges accompanies a rather lengthy
predicate preceding the question. 97 The predicate, which Allied omitted
from its tendered issue, is designed to prevent any comment on the weight of
the evidence. 98 The court held that rule 27999 and its call for "substantially
correct" wording of tendered issues justified the trial court's decision not to
submit the issue. 10 Since the tendered issue was affirmatively incorrect, the
trial court did not err in refusing to submit the issue.101
90. 728 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
91. 720 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ granted).
92. The worker had previously inspected and repaired this particular type of wrench and
had been responsible for connecting the defective wrench to the power source.
93. 728 S.W.2d at 842 n.l.
94. 720 S.W.2d at 827.
95. Id. The supreme court granted Cropper's application for writ of error on points con-
cerning this holding. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 478 (June 17, 1987).
96. 724 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1987).
97. 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 72.02A (1982).
98. 724 S.W.2d at 22; see also 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT
AND COUNTY COURTS § 12.03.2 n.4 (1983).
99. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
100. 724 S.W.2d at 21.
101. The parties in the case backed the trial court into a corner: the tendered issue was not
so incorrect that its submission would amount to reversible error, nor was it so correct that its
refusal was reversible error. The result was predicted by Professor McDonald's hypothetical:
Assume... that the plaintiff requests a special issue which... comments on the
weight of the evidence .... If such an issue could be deemed "substantially"
correct, the court must either give it and be reversed upon an appeal in the event
of a verdict adverse to the opponent of the requesting party; or decline to give it
and be reversed upon appeal in the event of a verdict adverse to the requesting
party; or attempt to frame a correct issue and perhaps be reversed on objections
by either party to the form of the wording adopted. A rule imposing such a
dilemma on the trial judge would be intolerable.




Placencio also reaffirmed the ruling in General Motors, Inc. v. Hopkins 102
by stating that the alteration of a product is a type of misuse and an affirma-
tive defense to a products liability suit, upon which the defendant has the
burden of proof.10 3
Strick Corp. v. Keen '04 is another products liability case with Duncan
overtones. Daryel Keen suffered an injury when he pulled his vehicle next to
a tractor trailer stored in his employer's workyard. While no one questioned
that Keen did not cause the trailer to fall over onto him, rules prohibited
him from parking so closely to a leaning trailer. The relevant question
before the court was whether contributory negligence meant that the plain-
tiff contributed to the accident or contributed to the injuries. 105 The court
concluded that the defective product did not solely cause Keen's injuries,
and as such Keen's conduct constituted a defense under Duncan.106
C. Definition of "Product"
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds 107 held that electric utilities
providing power are subject to strict product liability. Electricity is a form
of energy made, controlled, confined, transmitted, and distributed by man.
As such, the court held that electricity qualifies as a consumable product for
strict liability purposes.' 0 8 Further, the court ruled that electricity enters
the stream of commerce as soon as it flows into high-voltage transmission
lines, regardless of whether it is in its final consumable form.109 The court
imposed a duty upon Houston Lighting & Power, the distributor, to warn of




The survey period saw significant changes in the area of tort damages.
Moore v. Lillebo I1I abolished the rule requiring mental anguish to be accom-
panied by physical manifestation in a wrongful death case. The parents of
102. 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
103. 724 S.W.2d at 22.
104. 709 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
105. The cause was submitted January 21, 1987. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 149 (Jan. 21, 1987).
106. 709 S.W.2d at 294.
107. 712 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
108. Id. at 766; see also Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Colo.
1987) (court defined electricity as a consumable product).
109. 712 S.W.2d at 767.
110. The case was submitted on April 8, 1987. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 341 (Apr. 8, 1987). The
court granted application for writ of error on at least five points, which would appear to place
the strict liability holdings of the opinion before the court. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 267, 268 (Mar.
4, 1987).
Sisson v. Texas-New Mexico Power Co., 722 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no
writ), appears to involve issues similar to those raised by Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
Reynolds, but the court disposed of the appeal on other grounds.
111. 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1986).
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Paul Moore sued Douglas Lillebo in a wrongful death action, alleging that
Lillebo negligently fell asleep while driving his car. Lillebo's car drifted off
the road, and Moore, a passenger in the vehicle, died in the resulting acci-
dent. The supreme court held that the existence of a family relationship
establishes some evidence of mental anguish in the surviving family members
when one of the family members dies.' 1 2
Providing evidence of physical manifestation of mental anguish is no
longer the only method of proving mental anguish. 13 Courts have previ-
ously recognized the inequity of a rule requiring some physical manifestation
as a prerequisite to mental anguish damages.' 14 The unfairness of the mani-
festation requirement forced courts to go to great lengths to find some evi-
dence of a physical manifestation, and the supreme court chose to abolish
the rule completely rather than condone such judicial straining." 5
After finding some evidence of a family relationship, the court went on to
detail the jury instructions necessary for mental anguish submissions in
wrongful death cases. The court prescribed several factors to prevent any
double recovery.1 6 Juries should be instructed that mental anguish and loss
of society and companionship constitute separate elements of recovery and
should not allow damages to overlap.
St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard 11 extended the Moore v. Lillebo ration-
ale to non-wrongful-death cases. Garrard involved a mental anguish claim
brought by the parents of a stillborn infant mistakenly buried in an un-
marked common grave. The Garrards did not plead any facts suggesting a
112. Id. at 685. The court recognized the unlikelihood in the typical wrongful death case
that the surviving family members genuinely suffer no mental anguish. Id.
113. Id. at 686.
114. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982)
(court granted recovery to mother watching her six-month old child choke on substance in
baby food); Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 928, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 838 (1980) (court granted recovery for plaintiff's emotional distress and loss of
consortium resulting from doctor's erroneous diagnosis stating plaintiff's wife contracted
syphilis); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 173-71, 404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979) (court granted recovery
to mother watching automobile accident killing her child although she sustained no physical
injury); see also Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 258 (Tex. 1983) (Ray, J., concurring)
(advocating an abandonment of the physical injury requirement in mental anguish cases).
115. 722 S.W.2d 686 (citing Comment, Texas Bystander Recovery.- In the Aftermath of
Sanchez v. Schindler, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 896, 901 (1983)).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Spears argued that no evidence showed that Paul Moore's
mother suffered mental anguish of any kind. The recovering mother had not seen her son for
six years (except for a two-week period two weeks before his death). Paul Moore's father had
not seen his son for over two years prior to the accident, and had communicated with his son
on only three different occasions during those two years. 722 S.W.2d at 689. Further, the
dissent would require physical manifestation of mental anguish in order to insure that the
mental anguish rose to a compensable level (more than mere sorrow, anger, worry, or fear) and
defined the mental anguish as a severe emotional distress. Id. at 690. Finally, the minority
foresaw a double recovery because the loss of society and companionship would overlap the
new mental anguish recoveries. Id. at 691.
116. The factors prescribed by the court include: "(1) the relationship between husband
and wife or a parent and child; (2) the living arrangements of the parties; (3) any absence of the
deceased from the beneficiary for extended periods; (4) the harmony of family relations; and
(5) common interests and activities. 722 S.W.2d at 688.
117. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
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physical component to their mental anguish. Joining the trend in other ju-
risdictions,11 8 the court held that the Garrard petition stated a claim for
relief. 19 The justifications underlying the physical manifestation require-
ment no longer have a place in our society. First, as pointed out in Lillebo,
plaintiffs can almost always demonstrate some modicum of physical manifes-
tation of mental anguish.' 20 Second, medical science now understands and
appreciates mental anguish and psychological suffering more fully than in
the past. 1 2'
B. Wrongful Death
Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, Inc. 122 saw the supreme
court refuse to adopt a cause of action for the death of an unborn fetus.
While working at American General Capital Distributors, Kimberly Witty
tripped and fell over a utility outlet. At the time of her fall, Mrs. Witty
carried a viable fetus. Though a sonogram performed shortly after the acci-
dent showed that the fetus was alive, a second sonogram, taken six days
later, indicated that the fetus had died. Dissatisfied with her $546 workers'
compensation award, 123 Mrs. Witty brought suit against American General
under the Wrongful Death Act124 and Survival Statute 25 for the death of
her unborn child. The supreme court affirmed the summary judgment ren-
dered in favor of American General.' 26 Holding that it was bound to an
-interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act, the court refused to expand the
Act to cover actions for the death of unborn children.' 27 Analogizing to
Yandell v. Delgado,'28 which granted recovery for prenatal injuries to a child
118. The majority cited twelve jurisdictions that since 1978 had abolished the rule requir-
ing physical manifestation as a prerequisite for recovery of mental anguish damages. For a
listing of jurisdictions, see id. at 652 n.3.
119. Id. at 654.
120. Id. at 652-53. Compare this reasoning to Moore, 722 S.W.2d at 686.
121. 730 S.W.2d at 653. A four-member minority would limit the holding to cases involv-
ing mishandled corpses. Id. at 654. The minority, including Justice Campbell, the author of
Moore v. Lillebo, would have maintained the physical manifestation requirement in non-
wrongful death cases in order to discern between compensable and noncompensable mental
anguish. Id. at 655.
The difference between compensable and noncompensable anguish was the issue addressed
in Larrumbide v. Doctors Health Facilities, 734 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no
writ). The court denied parents recovery for future mental anguish that they might suffer
because of their daughter's death. The court allowed the award of damages for past mental
anguish, but upheld the jury's "zero" award for future mental anguish. Testimony showed the
Larrumbides were over the worst part of their grief and emotionally stable. As opposed to the
severe mental suffering that they had undergone, in the court's opinion the parents would only
suffer normal fear, anger, and sorrow in the future. Id. at 690.
122. 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
123. Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs. Inc., 697 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1985).
124. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1986).
125. § 71.021.
126. 727 S.W.2d at 506.
127. The court specifically declined to recognize a new cause of action or to rewrite the act
in the absence of legislative history demonstrating an intent to cover an unborn fetus within
the scope of the act. 727 S.W.2d at 504.
128. 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971).
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born alive and surviving, the court refused to allow a cause of action for the
death of an unborn child not born alive. 129 The Yandell holding further cut
off rights under the Survival Act, since Mrs. Witty could sue only for those
causes of action that her fetus would have had if born alive.130
A strongly written dissent13 1 took the majority to task for refusing to ex-
pand Texas tort law to allow recovery for the unborn child's death. Initially,
the dissent argued that the court had a responsibility to interpret the statute
in such a way as to recognize this cause of action. By relying upon the lack
of legislative history, the majority severely restricted the court's ability to
adjust and develop statutory causes of action.1 32 Yandell, according to the
dissent, held only that a fetus had to be viable at the time the injury occurred
in order to recover for that injury after birth.' 33 Further, Yandell involved
personal injuries, and should not be used as authority for interpreting the
Wrongful Death Act. 134 A sweeping portion of the dissent then reviewed
the common law and concluded that the legislature did not mean to restrict
the Wrongful Death Act to living children. 135
C. Foreseeability
Hinojosa v. South Texas Drilling & Exploration, Inc. 136 is another opinion
restricting damage law development. This case denied a bystander the right
to recover mental anguish damages. Reuben Hinojosa watched his close
friend fall to his death from a South Texas drilling rig. In denying recovery
for Hinojosa's mental anguish, the court of appeals reaffirmed Texas's adher-
ence to Dillon v. Legg.137 That case enumerated three factors to be consid-
ered when allowing recovery for emotional distress by a bystander.' 38
129. Id. at 570.
130. 471 S.W.2d at 569.
131. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 506-12 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
132. The dissent argued that the Texas Supreme Court is largely responsible for the devel-
opment of Texas tort law. Id. at 507 (citing Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630
(Tex. 1986); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand &
Gravel Co., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967); Hugo Schmeltzer & Co. v. Paiz, 104 Tex. 563, 141
S.W. 518 (1911); Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S.W. 1021 (1890)).
133. 727 S.W.2d at 507-08.
134. Id. at 508.
135. The dissent quoted Blackstone:
Life... begins in contemplation of law a[s] soon as an infant is able to stir in the
mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child... [and] if anyone beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this
though not murder, was by the antient law homicide or manslaughter.
Id. at 509 (quoting I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129).
136. 727 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
137. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Texas adopted the Dillon test
in Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
138. The Dillon factors are:
(1) Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock re-
sulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether the plaintiff and the vic-
tim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship.
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Because Hinojosa had no familial relationship with his co-worker, the court
decided that no recovery should be granted for mental anguish.' 3 9
Another traditional foreseeability case, Padget v. Gray,140 allowed a plain-
tiff to recover for post-accident depression and withdrawal. The court sanc-
tioned recovery despite testimony that the plaintiff's severe mental anguish
resulted from psychological problems that had occurred years before the col-
lision giving rise to the lawsuit.' 4 '
D. Gross Negligence
Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co. 142 held that an award of exemplary damages
under the Workers' Compensation Act does not depend upon a finding of
actual damages. 143 Disapproving portions of Fort Worth Elevators Co. v.
Russell,'" the court held that a workers' compensation plaintiff need not
submit an actual damages issue to the jury before seeking an award of puni-
tive damages. 145 Logically, a workers' compensation claimant cannot re-
cover actual damages, and as a result the court should not force the claimant
to submit a meaningless issue to the jury.
Two other gross negligence cases are also noteworthy. Winn Dixie-Texas,
Inc. v. Buck 146 held that post-verdict trial amendments for the purpose of
increasing the damages requested to meet the amount of damages awarded
by the jury are improper when made without the consent of the opposing
party. 147 Lawrence v. TD Industries 148 virtually foreclosed the possibility of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants in gross negligence cases. Be-
cause the defendant's mental attitude is critical to a determination of gross
negligence, those issues allow little component summary judgment proof.
Proof of intent, knowledge, and state of mind generally do not easily fit into
affidavits, and are best left to the determination of the jury. 149
68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920 69, Cal. Rptr. at 80.
139. 727 S.W.2d at 324. Judge Reavley's dissenting opinion in Harmon v. Grande Tire
Co., 821 F.2d 252, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1987), indicates that Schindler, Lillebo, and Garrard signal
Texas's desire to abandon all artificial restrictions on mental anguish recovery. Accordingly,
Judge Reavley would eliminate the bystander test as an arbitrary restraint on a claimant's right
to recover mental anguish damages.
140. 727 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
141. Id. at 711. This reaffirms the "eggshell skulled plaintiff" principle from Dulieu v.
White, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679.
142. 725 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1987).
143. Id. at 714.
144. 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934). The court in Russell required proof of actual
damages before granting a plaintiff exemplary damages. 123 Tex. at 150, 70 S.W.2d at 409.
145. 725 S.W.2d at 714.
146. 719 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
147. Id. at 255.
148. 730 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




1. Date of Commencement
In Morgan v. Ceiling Fan Warehouse, Inc. No. 3 150 the supreme court
reaffirmed the rule that prejudgment interest commences six months after
the date of the injury and not six months after the plaintiff actually incurred
medical expenses. 15' The court explained that the time for the commence-
ment of prejudgment interest as enforced in Cavnar v. Quality Central Park-
ing, Inc. 152 is arbitrary and something of a compromise. Nevertheless,
Cavnar meant exactly what it said, and interest can begin to run on damages
even before the plaintiff incurs them.' 53 The alternative method, calculating
interest from a date six months after actual incurence, would unduly burden
the trial system by requiring a determination of precisely when the plaintiff
incurred each element of damages.154
2. Segregation of Damages
Benavidez v. Isles Construction Co. 155 another supreme court case, clari-
fies the Cavnar rules for prejudgment interest. In Cavnar the court limited
the recovery of prejudgment interest to accrued actual damages, and did not
include prejudgment interest on punitive and future damages.' 56 The rule
required claimants to segregate accrued and future damages awards. The
court awarded the Benavidez plaintiff a single lump sum recovery that com-
bined both past and future damages.' 57 The supreme court allowed the
plaintiff to recover prejudgment interest on some of his past damages, in
spite of his failure to segregate his recovery. 158 First, a stipulation read into
the record at the beginning of the trial stated the amount of past medical
expenses and lost wages. Since the stipulation provided the only evidence of
those damages, the plaintiff sufficiently proved an amount of accrued dam-
ages. Further, the trial court judgment stated that Benavidez sustained
$1500 in property damage (the cost of his motorcycle). Again, the court
held that amount a sufficient segregation of past and future expenses.' 59 A
similar Fifth Circuit case, Harmon v. Grande Tire Co., 160 relied upon Bena-
videz to allow recovery of prejudgment interest awarded to the estate of a
plaintiff who died before trial. Even though there was no segregation, the
Fifth Circuit determined that the dead plaintiff's damage necessarily ac-
150. 725 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1987).
151. Id. at 716.
152. 696 S.W.2d 549, 555 (Tex. 1985).
153. 725 S.W.2d at 716.
154. 696 S.W.2d at 555.
155. 726 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1987).
156. 696 S.W.2d at 556.
157. Benavides v. Isles Constr. Co., 716 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1986), rev'd, 726 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1987).
158. 726 S.W.2d at 25.
159. Id.
160. 821 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1987).
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crued prior to trial and did not include future damages.161
3. Equity
DeSoto v. Matthews 162 clearly established that a plaintiff may recover pre-
judgment interest as damages making him whole. Disapproving of the court
of appeals' language suggesting that a trial court has discretion to reduce the
plaintiffs prejudgment interest award because of dilatory tactics,163 the
supreme court noted that prejudgment interest is not a tool to force a case to
trial. Instead, prejudgment interest compensates, the plaintiff for denial of
the opportunity to invest and earn interest on the amount of damages caused
by the defendant's actions. No equitable exception allows a trial judge to
reduce or eliminate that amount of recovery. 164 Lyons v. Ayala 165 followed
DeSoto in rejecting the argument that prejudgment interest should not ac-
crue if the defendant offered more to settle the case than the amount finally
awarded by the jury after trial.' 66 While other states deny prejudgment in-
terest after the defendant makes a settlement offer, 167 those jurisdictions re-
quire an unconditional tender (such as paying the money into the registry of
the court) in order to toll prejudgment interest. 168 Wood v. Armco, Inc. 169
also tracked DeSoto in holding that a showing of dilatory tactics on a defend-
ant's part is not a prerequisite to a recovery of prejudgment interest under
the Cavnar principles. 170
4. Procedure for Recovery of Prejudgment Interest
Procedurally, Benavidez v. Isles Construction Co. 171 relies on well-estab-
lished principles to require that plaintiffs seeking prejudgment interest bring
such a request to the trial court's attention. 172 While Cavnar created some
difficulties because it applied to all cases "still in the judicial process" as well
as future cases, it did not eliminate the need to plead for prejudgment inter-
est or to object to a trial court's failure to award it.173 Home Interiors &
Gifts, Inc. v. Veliz 174 and Houston Power & Lighting Co. v. Reynolds 175 both
161. Id. at 259. The plaintiff died of causes unrelated to the accident giving rise to the
lawsuit. Id. at 254 n.1.
162. 714 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 721
S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1986).
163. 714 S.W.2d at 136.
164. 721 S.W.2d at 287.
165. 723 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
166. Id. at 258. Compare this approach to the new statutory provisions concerning pre-
judgment interest. Act of June 3, 1987, ch. 3, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 15 (Vernon).
167. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6013 (1987); Wis. STAT. § 807.01 (1987).
168. 723 S.W.2d at 258.
169. 814 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1987).
170. Id. at 214.
171. 726 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1987); see supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
172. For instance, TEX. R. Civ. P. 301 requires that the judgment conform to the pleading.
173. 726 S.W.2d at 25; see Vidor Walgreen Pharmacy v. Fisher, 728 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
1987) (court reversed award granting prejudgment interest because of plaintiff's failure to re-
quest prejudgment interest in the pleadings).
174. 725 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
175. 712 S.W.2d 761, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
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clearly require a dissatisfied plaintiff to inform the court of his desire to re-
cover prejudgment interest. 176 Further, Veliz held that trial courts cannot
award prejudgment interest after losing plenary jurisdiction.177
F Contribution and Indemnity
1. Contribution
One of the most complex cases in this complicated area of law is Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins.178 Two doctors, Wiley Jinkins and Richard Wie-
ner, were injured when the engine of Jinkins's Beech aircraft failed during
take-off. Both doctors filed products liability suits against the engine sup-
plier, Beech, and the manufacturer, Teledyne. Teledyne and Beech settled
with Wiener by an agreement in which Wiener assigned to them any rights
to sue Jinkins. Wiener nonsuited Beech and Teledyne, who promptly filed
cross-actions against Jinkins for contribution or indemnity.
The trial court granted Jinkins's motion for summary judgment, holding
that the defendants had no right to contribution. The court of appeals af-
firmed, 17 9 considering three possible contribution schemes: (1) statutory
contribution under old article 2212,180 (2) comparative contribution under
old article 2212a, 18 1 or (3) the Duncan v. Cessna 182 common law contribu-
tion formula.
A divided Houston court of appeals held that Beech and Teledyne could
not seek contribution from Jinkins because they did not follow the correct
procedures when settling with Wiener: under the statutory provisions and
Duncan, settling defendants are entitled to contribution only when their per-
centage of causation is judicially determined. 83 Since the trial court had not
rendered judgment in this case,' 84 the court did not allow contribution. The
court, however, specifically left open contribution rights in cases in which
the settling defendants owed amounts on the judgment.8 5
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's opinion, but held that an
agreed judgment could never provide a basis for contribution claims.' 8 6 As
the court explained, the prerequisite for a contribution claim is a judgment
finding that the party seeking contribution paid a disproportionate share of
176. Veliz, 725 S.W.2d at 297; Reynolds, 712 S.W.2d at 774.
177. 725 S.W.2d at 297.
178. 739 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1987).
179. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jenkins, 698 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985), rev'd, 739 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1987).
180. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (repealed 1985), recodified at TEX. REV. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE, §§ 33.001-.003 (Vernon 1986).
181. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (repealed 1985), recodified at TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE, §§ 33.001, 33.011-.017 (Vernon 1986) amended by Act of Sept. 2, 1987,
1st Called Session, ch. 2, §§ 2.02-.11B, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 77-85 (Vernon).
182. 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 n.8 (Tex. 1984).
183. 698 S.W.2d at 726-27.
184. The order of dismissal following the Wiener nonsuit did not incorporate the settle-
ment agreement. Id. at 726.
185. Id.
186. 739 S.W.2d at 21.
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his or her liability. 18 7 Agreed judgments, however, cannot provide a basis
for a subsequent contribution claim in a comparative negligence case.,8 8
Jinkins also stands for the proposition that settling defendants cannot buy
a plaintiff's cause of action against then-unnamed defendants. 18 9 Dr. Wei-
ner never named the pilot, Jinkins, as a defendant, and the court found it
against public policy to allow such secondary suits. 190
Ralston-Purina Co. v. Barkley Feed & Seed Co. 191 grew out of a lawsuit
filed by Barkley against Purina and its fish-meal supplier, International Pro-
teins Corporation (IPC), alleging that Purina and IPC had sold contami-
nated chicken feed. Before trial, Purina settled with Barkley for $340,000
and an assignment to Purina of any possible recovery due Barkley from any
third party.192 Barkley's suit against Purina and IPC, originally set in 1978,
was dismissed sometime in early 1984. Purina filed a motion to reinstate
Barkley's lawsuit and filed an amended cross-action against IPC. The
amended cross-action sought contribution for the amounts that Purina paid
to Barkley and contained independent causes of action against Barkley. The
court of appeals held that Purina had the right to recover from ,IPC on the
indemnity agreement, 193 but the supreme court granted IPC's application
for writ of error on points alleging that the release between Barkley and
Purina did not assign a cause of action to Purina and that Purina lacked
standing to reinstate Barkley's lawsuit.' 94
2. Indemnity
Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co. 195 involved an indemnity agree-
ment between a workers' compensation subscribing employer and the owner
of premises who contracted with the employer. Donald Metcalf, employed
by Daniel Construction Co., worked on property owned by the Ethyl Corpo-
ration when he was injured in an accident caused by Ethyl's negligence. Af-
ter settling his workers' compensation claim against Daniel Construction
Co., Metcalf sued Ethyl. Ethyl in turn sued Daniel, seeking contractual in-
demnity.196 The court of appeals reversed the trial court and held that the
187. Id. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Ray and in which Justice Gonzales
joined, would allow contribution rights in favor of settling defendants in order to encourage
the settlement of lawsuits. Id. at 22-23.
188. Id. at 21-22.
189. Id. at 22.
190. The court created an exception to the general rule that the cause of action for damages
may be sold or assigned. Finding that public policy discourages such assignments, the court
declined to allow such actions in order to preserve contribution rights. Id.
191. 722 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
192. The full text of the relevant portions of the agreement appears at 722 S.W.2d at 434.
193. Id.
194. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 7 (Oct. 7, 1987). The case is set for submission on Jan. 13, 1988.
Id. at 4.
195. 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
196. The contract between Ethyl and Daniel provided that "[Daniel Construction Co.]
shall indemnify and hold [Ethyl] harmless against any loss or damage to persons or property as
a result of operations growing out of the performance of this contract and caused by the negli-
gence or carelessness of [Daniel Construction Co.], [Daniel Construction Co.'s] employees,
Subcontractors, and agents or licensees." 725 S.W.2d at 707.
[Vol. 42
PERSONAL TORTS
language did not "clearly and unequivocably" require Daniel to indemnify
Ethyl for Ethyl's own negligence.1 97 In affirming the court of appeals, the
supreme court adopted a new standard for examining contracts purporting
to indemnify parties for their own negligence. Moving away from the "clear
and unequivocable" language standard, the court adopted the "express neg-
ligence" test for determining the meaning of indemnity contracts.1 98 Under
the express negligence doctrine, the intent of the parties must appear within
the writing of the contract. The effect is to require parties wishing to indem-
nify themselves for their own negligence to expressly state that intent within
the contract.199 The court abandoned the old standard because of the
number of lawsuits generated in attempts to construe the specific language of
those agreements. 2°° Overruling portions of three earlier supreme court
cases, 201 the court appeared to fashion policy designed to cut through the
ambiguity and double-speak occasioned by the old standard. 20 2
Courts applied the express negligence rule to similar indemnity contracts
in Singleton v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 203 and Gulf Coast Masonry v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. 204 One court of appeals opinion, Adams v. Spring Valley
Construction Co. ,205 properly held that the express negligence rule applied to
all documents purporting to contain indemnity contracts. 206 Another court
of appeals decision, Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Jennings,207 applied
the Ethyl express negligence rule to a contract purporting to indemnify one
party for its own gross negligence. 208
3. Mary Carter Agreements
One of the most complicated cases in the Survey period, Scurlock Oil Co.
v. Smithwick,2°9 arose when George Smithwick and Clay Carrol Dove, two
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company employees, died in a van/trailer truck
collision. The Smithwick heirs filed suit in Nueces County against the rail-
road company, the truck owner (Scurlock Oil Company), the truck driver
(Ernest Lewis), the van owner (Victoria Carrier Services), and the van driver
197. 714 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), aff'd, 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.
1987).
198. 725 S.W.2d at 708.
199. Id.
200. "[T]he scriveners of indemnity agreements have devised novel ways of writing provi-
sions which fail to expressly state the true intent of those provisions. The intent of the scriven-
ers is to indemnify the indemnitee for its negligence, yet be just ambiguous enough to conceal
that intent from the indemnitor." Ethyl, 725 S.W.2d at 707-08.
201. Joe Adams & Son v. McCann Constr. Co., 475 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1971); Ohio Oil
Co. v. Smith, 365 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. 1963); Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 303
S.W.2d 775, 779 (1957).
202. The court held that Ethyl's contract with Daniel did not expressly indemnify Ethyl
for its own negligence. 725 S.W.2d at 708.
203. 729 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1987).
204. 739 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. 1987).
205. 728 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
206. Id. at 415.
207. 727 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
208. Id. at 742. Interestingly, Jennings and Singleton arose out of the same accident.
209. 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986).
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(Ronnie Wayne Bounds). The Dove heirs filed suit in Matagorda County
against the same defendants. In the Dove action, Scurlock Oil Company
entered a Mary Carter Agreement, guaranteeing the plaintiffs at least a 2.5
million dollar recovery. A jury found that the Missouri Pacific Railroad,
through its borrowed servant, Bounds, ninety percent negligent.
21 0
Because the Dove case was still on appeal when the court set the second
lawsuit for trial, 21' Scurlock Oil Company sought to abate the Smithwick
trial until the Dove judgment became final, and use collateral estoppel to
preserve the jury finding that Missouri Pacific was ninety percent responsi-
ble. 2 12 The Nueces County District Court overruled this plea in abatement
and allowed the Smithwick case to proceed to trial.
In the Nueces County litigation, Missouri Pacific Railroad entered into a
similar Mary Carter Agreement guaranteeing the Smithwick plaintiffs 2.5
million dollars. The details of this Mary Carter Agreement were not read to
the jury in the Nueces County suit, but Smithwick's lawyers advised the jury
panel of its existence during voir dire examination, and the Scurlock Oil
Company lawyer commented upon the guaranty agreement during closing
argument.
Although the Smithwicks had nonsuited Ernest Lewis, the Scurlock Oil
driver, they called him as an adverse witness and sought to impeach him
with the Mary Carter Agreement that the Dove heirs and his employer had
entered into in the first suit. Lewis denied knowing that Scurlock Oil had
guaranteed any amount of money to the Dove heirs and denied knowing any
details about the Matagorda case. After Lewis was finished testifying, and
without any witness on the stand, the Smithwick's attorney read to the jury
portions of the Mary Carter Agreement between the Dove heirs and
Scurlock Oil Company.
The supreme court held the Mary Carter Agreement inadmissible in this
case. 2 13 Though the Smithwicks purported to admit the agreement in order
to show Lewis's bias, the fact that Lewis did not sign the agreement, coupled
with the fact that he had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the prior
suit or his employer's settlement, meant that the Mary Carter Agreement
could not be introduced into evidence. 214 Further, attempting to blunt the
effect of the Mary Carter Agreement admission during closing argument did
not waive Scurlock's objection to it.2 15
210. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Huebner, 704 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ).
211. Judgment was not yet final in Huebner. See id.
212. See Bonniwell v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1984) (court acknowl-
edged potential applicability of collateral estoppel doctrine in product liability case, but plain-
tiff failed to establish requisite factors for its use).
213. 724 S.W.2d at 4.
214. Id.
215. Id. The court also announced a new rule on finality of judgments in Texas. Prior to
Smithwick, Texas was one of the few jurisdictions holding that a judgment on appeal is not
final for issue preclusion purposes. The court adopted the Restatement rule "that a judgment
is final for the purposes of issue and claim preclusion 'despite the taking of an appeal unless
what is called an appeal actually consists of a trial de novo.' " Id. at 6 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 comment f (1982)).
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Another suit based on the same cause of action, Bounds v. Scurlock Oil
Co.,216 followed the Smithwick rationale and held that a party can introduce
Mary Carter Agreements into evidence only to impeach or show bias on the
part of witnesses. In the Bounds case, the agreement was between Bounds
and Missouri Pacific, yet was offered to show bias or prejudice upon the part
of Scurlock Oil Company.217
Mary Carter Agreements are no different from any other contracts, and
the court typically looked to contract rules for determining the meaning and
intent of Mary Carter Agreements. In Allison v. National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co. 218 the supreme court interpreted an unambiguous Mary Carter
Agreement as requiring reimbursement based upon a gross recovery in order
to satisfy fully the party's intent.219
IV. PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
A. Medical Malpractice--Statute of Limitations
Several cases during the Survey period clarified the statutes of limitation
applicable to medical malpractice actions. The supreme court refused the
writ of error in Tinkle v. Henderson,220 adopting the Tyler court's opinion as
its own. The case involved a patient who became mentally incapacitated
because of oxygen deprivation during an adverse reaction to morphine. In
reversing the summary judgment rendered in favor of the hospital, the court
held that the two-year statute of limitations under the old insurance code221
did not apply to extinguish the right of a mentally incompetent person before
that person regained legal capacity. The Tyler court of appeals relied upon
the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution,222 and analogized the
situation to the child-plaintiff in Sax v. Votteler.223 In Sax the court held
that the legislature could not impose an absolute two-year statute of limita-
tions upon a minor injured by medical malpractice. The court held the stat-
ute of limitations unconstitutional in Sax because the statute abolished the
minor's right to bring a common law cause of action without providing a
reasonable alternative.224 In Tinkle the same analysis applied to the six-
month notice requirement under the Torts Claims Act.225
Another case, Tsai v. Wells 226 followed Neagle v. Nelson 227 and Nelson v.
216. 730 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
217. 730 S.W.2d at 70.
218. 734 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1987).
219. Id. at 646.
220. 730 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, writ ref'd).
221. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865, repealed by Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, pt. 4, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039,
2064 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
222. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
223. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
224. Id at 667.
225. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon 1986).
226. 725 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
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Krusen 228 in holding that the open courts provision of the Texas Constitu-
tion 229 creates a modified discovery rule that tolls the two-year statute of
limitations of article 4590230 until a claimant has had a reasonable opportu-
nity to discover a cause of action. 231 In Tsai silk sutures that led to pelvic
inflammatory disease allegedly caused the injuries in a young woman. The
court of appeals upheld the jury's finding that the plaintiff did not have a
reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong that occurred until follow-up
surgery revealed the use of the nondissolving sutures.232 Del Rio v.
Jinkins233 tracked Tsai in a case in which a doctor improperly performed
radiation treatment eventually necessitating a colostomy. The opinion upon
motion for rehearing made it clear that the Corpus Christi court viewed the
Texas open courts234 provision as requiring a modified discovery rule, pro-
viding a reasonable opportunity to discover the injury before the statute of
limitations can run.235
Rascoe v. Anabtawi 236 relied upon Hill v. Milani 237 to conclude that the
wrongful survival statute238 does not toll the statute of limitations in a
wrongful death survival action arising out of medical malpractice. 239 Hill
held that an absence from the state does not affect the two-year statute of
limitations in spite of the tolling provisions of the survival statute. Absence
from the state was not a specific tolling provision within the meaning of
article 4590,24o and as such could not override the two-year statute of limi-
tations. 241 The Beaumont court of appeals relied upon the same analysis to
conclude that the survival statute cannot trump article 4590i.2 42 Rascoe also
declined to hold that article 4590i is a per se violation of the open courts
243
provision of the Texas Constitution. 2 ."
228. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
229. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
230. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
231. Tsai, 725 S.W.2d at 273.
232. Id.
233. 730 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
235. 730 S.W.2d at 128. The opinion on motion for rehearing emphasizes that the court
did not directly apply the discovery rule. Id.
236. 730 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
237. 686 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1985).
238. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.062 (Vernon 1986).
239. Rascoe, 730 S.W.2d at 461.
240. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
241. 868 S.W.2d at 611.
242. 730 S.W.2d at 461.
243. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
244. 730 S.W.2d at 463. Under Morris v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1985), a statute of
limitations violates the constitution when it cuts off the right to bring suit "before the person
has a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong and bring suit." Id. at 207 (emphasis in
original) (citing Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984)). The Rascoe plaintiffs did
not demonstrate themselves unable to discover their injuries before the statute of limitations
ran, and thus did not show that the statute denied them a reasonable opportunity to bring suit.




Rodriguez v. Reeves 245 stands for the proposition that the plaintiff must
still establish the standard of care in a malpractice case.24 6 At trial Rodri-
guez failed to introduce any evidence establishing the medical standard of
care in the community. All of the testimony on the standard of care came
from defense witnesses who stated that the defendants acted in accordance
with good medical practices. With no evidence to show that the treating
physician or the hospital staff breached the standard for medical care in the
community, the court did not have to address the threshold issue on medical
malpractice; therefore, a directed verdict was proper.247
Two other cases, Kissinger v. Turner24 8 and Duff v. Yelin, 249 are primarily
cases regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, but also involve discussions of
res ipsa loquitur as it applies to medical malpractice cases. In Kissinger the
majority held that leaving a surgical clamp attached to a plaintiff's intestine
was not negligence as a matter of law.250 Foreign object cases are subject to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which eliminates the need for expert testi-
mony in order to justify jury submission, but the court reasoned that the
doctrine does not supplant the necessity of showing the defendant's negli-
gence.251 Duff involved allegations that the plaintiff suffered nerve injury
because of improper arm positioning during neck surgery. The court refused
to allow the application of res ipsa loquitur because no evidence established
that the injury was the sort that did not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence. 252 Further, the plaintiff introduced no evidence that the cause of
the injury was an instrumentality or occurrence within the defendant's
control.253
C. Medical Malpractice-Other Cases
Smith v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System 254 overturned a summary
judgment based upon material issues of fact concerning the ostensible agency
of an emergency room physician. Recognizing that public policy requires
245. 730 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
246. Id. at 21; Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, Standard of Care, 22 Hous.
L. REV. 47, 59 (1985).
247. 730 S.W.2d at 21; see Webster v. Johnson, 737 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) (doctor's post-operative treatment did not meet standard of care
established by the community).
248. 727 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
249. 721 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
250. 727 S.W.2d at 755.
251. Id.
252. 721 S.W.2d at 371.
253. Id. Chief Justice Evans would have allowed a jury issue on the hospital's liability.
Id., at 374 (Evans, C.J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that some testimony showed that
external pressure on the plaintiff's elbow caused the damage to the ulnar nerve. The evidence
also indicated that pressure most likely occurred while the plaintiff was unconscious or after
the plaintiff regained consciousness in a recovery room. Expert testimony further showed that
the hospital had an affirmative duty to position a patient's arms so that any movements did not
apply undue pressure to the ulnar nerve. Id.
254. 720 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the imposition of strict duties upon institutions billed as full-service hospi-
tals, 255 the court held that an agency by estoppel arises when the hospital
creates an appearance that the emergency room personnel are hospital em-
ployees. 256 Patients arriving in an emergency room are thus entitled to con-
clude that a doctor providing emergency care is a hospital employee.
257
Williams v. Sun Valley Hospital258 declined to extend a hospital's duty to
protect third persons against dangerous patients. The case arose when a pa-
tient committed to Sun Valley's Acute Cases Ward escaped from the hospi-
tal and threw himself in front of a car driven by Pamela Williams. She
brought suit for the injuries that she suffered in the resulting accident, but
the El Paso court of appeals held that the hospital owed no duty to third
persons. 259 Distinguishing Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California 260
and relying upon the reasoning in Thompson v. County of Alameda,261 the
court refused to impose a duty absent evidence of a mental patient's danger-
ousness to readily identified persons. 262 Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark 263
did not apply because the hospital took no affirmative act that would have
increased Williams's danger. 264 The evidence showed that, unlike Otis Engi-
neering's obviously drunken employee, 265 the Sun Valley patient had never
shown an intent to escape from the institution, nor had the hospital acted to
facilitate his escape. 266
Also of interest in the area of medical malpractice is the certified question
in Lucas v. United States,267 which gives the Texas Supreme Court the op-
portunity to address the constitutionality of section 11.02 of the Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.268 Section 11.02 limits the civil
liability for damages caused by a health care provider. The Fifth Circuit in
Lucas held that the statutory cap on damages did not violate the United
States Constitution.269 The court passed to the Texas Supreme Court the
255. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App.2d 61, 66, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190-91
(1980) (patient died due to medical malpractice by third party emergency room personnel of a
full-service hospital).
256. Smith, 720 S.W.2d at 625.
257. Id. The opinion also held that the physician's professional association that contracted
with the hospital to provide emergency room personnel could be vicariously liable for the
negligence of their employee. Id. at 627.
258. 723 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
259, at 787.
260. Cal. 3d 425, 439, 551 P.2d 334, 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976) (court imposed
duty on hospital to exercise reasonable care to control behavior of patient known to be danger-
ous to others).
261. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 754-55, 614 P.2d 728, 735-37, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 77 (1980) (court
failed to impose duty to warn foreseeable victim of patient's harm).
262. Williams, 723 S.W.2d at 787.
263. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
264. 723 S.W.2d at 787.
265. 668 S.W.2d at 311.
266. 723 S.W.2d at 784. In his dissenting opinion Justice Fuller argued that the hospital
had knowledge that the patient was dangerous, as evidenced by the fact that the hospital ad-
mitted him to a ward reserved for acute crises patients needing careful scrutiny. In addition,
the patient had previously assaulted a staff member. Id. at 787.
267. 807 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1986).
268. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
269. Lucas, 807 F.2d at 422.
[ ol. 42
PERSONAL TORTS
question of the cap's constitutionality under the Texas Constitution.270 Lu-
cas was submitted on October 7, 1987, and five weeks later, the court
granted the application for writ of error in Rose v. Doctor's Hospital,271 in
which the Dallas court broke rank with the Beaumont and Corpus Christi
courts of appeals in holding the damage limitation a permissible exercise of
legislative power.272
D. Legal Malpractice
Heath v. Herron 273 involved an attorney's failure to verify a rule 93 plead-
ing. 274 While representing Glenn Earl Herron in a dissolution of partner-
ship suit, attorney Bob Heath filed an answer on Herron's behalf, denying
the existence of a partnership between the former business associates. The
case went to trial, and at the close of Herron's defense opposing counsel
moved to strike all controverting testimony and require a directed verdict on
grounds that the denial had not been verified. Since it appeared that the trial
court would grant the directed verdict, the parties quickly undertook settle-
ment negotiations and Herron paid $250,000 to settle the case. Herron then
sued his attorney for legal malpractice, alleging that the pleading defect led
to a one-sided settlement. Reviewing the jury's verdict returned against the
attorney in the legal malpractice claim, the court of appeals held that the
measure of damages equalled the difference between the settlement amount
actually paid and the amount that would have been paid had the pleading
been properly verified. 275 The court declined to allow the recovery for
mental anguish in legal malpractice cases absent evidence of unusual circum-
stances.276 Finally, an announcement of "ready" in open court at the com-
mencement of the underlying suit did not amount to a representation within
the meaning of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.27
7
Willis v. Maverick,278 a statute of limitations case, involved an attorney
accused of committing malpractice by representing both sides in a divorce.
Upon appeal, the court first considered whether the four-year or two-year
statute of limitations governed the case. 279 Rejecting the view that a legal
malpractice claim is an action for debt, the court held that the claim sounds
in tort and the tort limitations statute controls.280 The court then addressed
when the cause of action arose. Declining to adopt the discovery rule, the
court of appeals held that in a legal malpractice case the statute begins to
270. The court used rule 114 to pass the question of constitutionality to the supreme court.
TEX. R. App. P. 114(a).
271. 735 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
272. Id. at 254.
273. 732 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
274. TEx. R. Civ. P. 93.
275. 732 S.W.2d at 753.
276. Id.
277. Id
278. 723 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ granted).
279. The two-year statute of limitations found in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.003 (Vernon 1986) governs tort actions. The four-year statute of limitations found in id.
§ 16.004 governs contract actions and actions for recovery of debt.
280. 723 S.W.2d at 261.
19881
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
run at the date of "legal injury. '281 A legal injury occurs when the force
producing an injury is wrongfully set in motion and eventually causes dam-
ages. 28 2 Here, the legal injury occurred when the attorney first undertook to
represent both parties to a divorce. The existence of a fiduciary relationship,
however, creates a duty on the part of the attorney to disclose matters that
might breach that fiduciary duty.283 The failure to disclose facts in a fiduci-
ary relationship strongly implies a fraudulent concealment. The existence of
a fiduciary relationship tolls the statute of limitations during the period of
time in which the fiduciary relationship exists.284 In Maverick the fiduciary
duty ended two years and eleven days before the plaintiff filed the malprac-
tice suit against the former attorney; therefore, the statute of limitations
barred the action. 28 5
Another noteworthy legal malpractice case is Berry v. Dodson, Nunley &
Taylor, P.C. 286 The case presents the question of whether an attorney owes
any duty to the intended beneficiaries of a will when the attorney fails to
prepare the will in accordance with the testator's instructions. Henry Berry
employed an attorney to write a new will for him, but died before executing
the will. Mr. Berry's former will, executed in 1977, was admitted into pro-
bate and the estate was disposed according to its terms. Only Berry's chil-
dren by a former marriage took under the probated will. Berry's widow
brought an action against the attorney who was supposed to have drafted the
new will, alleging that under the proposed will, her own children would have
shared on an equal basis and that the proposed will would have devised cer-
tain business interests to her. The trial court granted a motion for summary
judgment on the premise that the attorneys owed no duty to Mrs. Berry and
her children, and the court of appeals affirmed that decision. 28 7 The court of
appeals noted that although several states have allowed intended benefi-
ciaries to recover in such cases, Texas privity does not allow recovery in such
a situation.288 Resolution of this issue by the supreme court must await an-
other case.
V. IMMUNITY
A. Texas Tort Claims Act
Three recent cases turn on the meaning of the term "use" for purposes of
the Texas Tort Claims Act.289 Brown & Root, Inc. v. Cities Municipal Utility
281. Id.
282. Id. (citing Liles v. Phillips, 677 S.W.2d 802, 808 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Pack v. Taylor, 584 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
283. 723 S.W.2d at 262.
284. Id.
285. Id. The dissent argued that the legal injury test violates the open courts doctrine
because it extinguishes a cause of action without a reasonable opportunity to bring suit. 723
S.W.2d at 263 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
286. 717 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd).
287. Id. at 719.
288. Id.
289. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021 (Vernon 1986).
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District 290 held that allegations of negligence in the design, installation, and
use of a culvert system stated a claim under the Tort Claims Act. 291 The
suit arose after subsidence in a housing subdivision caused foundation
problems and made the homes uninhabitable. The court relied upon the
definition in Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District,29 2 and held that designing
and installing the culvert system constituted a use of real property. 293 The
court also required no physical manifestation in order to recover for mental
anguish damages inflicted by the Utility District's negligence because of an
exception to the requirement to the general rule requiring proof of physical
injury resulting from mental anguish. 294
Bryant v. Metropolitan Transit Authority295 involved an assault that oc-
curred on a Metropolitan Transit Authority bus. Timothy Bryant brought
suit alleging that the bus driver acted negligently in failing to exercise due
care to prevent the assault and in aggravating Bryant's injuries. Recognizing
that the transit authority, as a common carrier, owed a high duty of care to
its passengers, the Houston court gave the Tort Claims Act a broad interpre-
tation and held that Bryant sufficiently alleged a use of the vehicle as to
allow the cause of action. 296 In reaching that holding the court distin-
guished those cases involving incidents on school buses,297 noting that the
Tort Claims Act subjects school districts to much narrower liability. 298
Diaz v. Central Plains Regional Hospital 299 involved a nonuse of tangible
personal property. Racquel Diaz sought admission to the Central Plains Re-
gional Hospital (operated by the Hale County Hospital Authority). The
hospital denied her admission because she had neither money nor health
insurance with which to pay for her treatment. Three days later another
hospital admitted Mrs. Diaz and she underwent an unsuccessful treatment
for a cancerous tumor. The Fifth Circuit relied upon City of Denton v. Van
290. 721 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, no writ).
291. Id. at 884.
292. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983). The court defined use as "to put or bring into action or
service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose." Id. at 33 (citing Beggs v. Texas Dep't of
Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
writ ref'd)).
293. Brown & Root, 721 S.W.2d at 884.
294. id. at 885. The court held that the petition stated a claim for mental anguish because
of an exception to the general rule requiring that physical manifestation is a prerequisite to the
recovery of mental anguish damages. Id. St. Elizabeth's Hospital v. Garrard abolished the
physical manifestation rule in cases seeking recovery for negligent affliction of mental anguish.
See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
295. 722 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
296. Id. at 740.
297. See e.g., Estate of Garza v. McAllen Indep. School Dist., 613 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (student killed in fight while riding school bus); Pier-
son v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 698 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (student injured while riding on exploding homecoming float); Hopkins v.
Spring Indep. School Dist., 706 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), aff'd,
736 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1987) (student failed to receive adequate medical care both at school and
on school bus).
298. 722 S.W.2d at 741.
299. 802 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Page 300 and Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring 301 to hold nonad-
mission to a hospital not a use of tangible property subject to the Tort
Claims Act.30 2 The Fifth Circuit went further than City of Denton or Her-
ring and added a requirement that the tangible property be defective before
an action will lie.30 3 Citing Velasquez v. Jamar,3° 4 the court apparently
grafted an additional requirement on a Tort Claims Act claim. 30 The court
also determined that the day the cause of action arises determines whether
sovereign immunity attaches to a governmental unit.30 6 In this case the hos-
pital refused to admit Mrs. Diaz on May 16, 1983. Between that date and
the date she died in 1985, the Hale County Hospital Authority sold the hos-
pital to a private corporation. 30 7
Two cases involving school districts also merit consideration. Hopkins v.
Spring Independent School District 30 8 confirmed the Bryant court's analysis
that the Tort Claims Act subjects school districts to very narrow windows of
liability.309 Although Hopkins qualifies primarily as a Texas Education
Code immunity case, 310 the court held that the Tort Claims act provided no
cause of action for injuries not proximately caused by the use or operation of
the school bus. 311 Celeste Adeline Hopkins suffered a head injury at school,
allegedly caused by a teacher's negligence in leaving a classroom un-
supervised and allegedly aggravated by the school nurses' failure to take ac-
tion when the child appeared to be ill. The teachers and nurses allowed
Celeste to stay in the classroom until the end of the day, when she took the
school bus to a day care center. While on the bus, Celeste suffered severe
convulsions, and although the driver radioed a request for help, the school
district instructed him to continue onto the day care center where the girl
was eventually treated. Since the operation of the school bus did not proxi-
mately cause Celeste's injuries, the court affirmed the summary judgment in
favor of the school district. 312
In addition to its Tort Claims Act holdings, Hopkins also applied an im-
munity found in the Texas Education Code.313 This broad grant of immu-
nity prevented imposition of liability on the part of the school nurse, a
school teacher, and a principal who failed to aid an elementary school child
300. 701 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Tex. 1986).
301. 513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1974).
302. 802 F.2d at 144. Language in Herring indicated that "a failure to give medical care
cannot involve the use of tangible property." 513 S.W.2d at 9 (citing Beggs v. Texas Dept. of
Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
writ ref'd).
303. 802 F.2d at 144.
304. 584 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
305. 802 F.2d at 144.
306. Id. at 143.
307. The court did not reach the issue of whether governmental immunity could have ex-
tended past the date of the sale. Id. at 144 n.2.
308. 736 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1987).
309. See supra note 295-98.
310. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.912 (Vernon 1987).
311. 736 S.W.2d at 619.
312. Id.
313. See supra note 310.
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who suffered a head injury in her classroom.314 Deferring to Barr v. Bern-
hard, 315 the court held that only injuries resulting from the excessive use of
force during discipline are actionable. 316 Merely submitting a child to the
authority of a nurse, teacher, or principal is not discipline that would qualify
as an exception to the immunity.317 A three-judge minority would have fol-
lowed other jurisdictions in holding that tort immunity of school districts
does not preclude tort liability from the negligence of professional school
employees. 3' 8
Stout v. Grand Prairie Independent School District 319 affirmed the statuto-
rily granted immunity within the Texas Education Code in the context of a
constitutional challenge based upon the open courts3 20 and due process
guarantees.32' In balancing the legislative basis for the immunity versus the
plaintiff's right to recovery, the court held that the state's interest in quality
public education outweighed the infringement on the right to redress occa-
sioned for the immunity.322 The court also rejected an opportunity to abro-
gate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, employing the same balancing
test.
323
The second case, Heyer v. North East Independent School District,324
found a school district not liable for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of
the school district's failure to control traffic on its premises properly. Since
the school district did not own or operate the automobile that struck the
plaintiff, there was no operation or use of a motor vehicle within the scope of
the tort claims exception. 325
B. Governmental Immunity
Wyse v. Department of Public Safety 326 erected a shield of official immu-
nity around public officials conducting investigations as part of their official
duties. Two Hillsboro police officers, Thomas Wyse and H.E. Wardlow,
sued the local district attorney, the sheriff of Hill County, and two Texas
Rangers for the tortious interference with business relationships and inva-
sion of privacy. 327 The suit arose out of an investigation that revealed that
314. 736 S.W.2d at 618.
315. 562 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1978).
316. 736 S.W.2d at 618.
317. Id. at 619.
318. 736 S.W.2d at 620 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). The dissent cited to twenty-four opin-
ions from other jurisdictions holding professional school employees liable for negligence. Id.
at 620 n.1.
319. 733 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
320. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
321. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 19.
322. 733 S.W.2d at 294.
323. Id. at 298.
324. 730 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
325. Id. at 132.
326. 733 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
327. The Texas Department of Public Safety was also a defendant, but the court held that
there was no waiver of sovereign immunity for any cause of action under the Tort Claims Act.
Id. at 228. The employees' immunity also shielded their employer. Id.
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the two police officers participated in several criminal activities. The Waco
court of appeals concentrated on the quasijudicial immunity enjoyed by pub-
lic officials acting in good faith within the scope of their authority. 328 The
chief of police, the district attorney, and the Texas Rangers were all acting in
good faith and within the scope of their authority when investigating the
alleged criminal conspiracies. 329 In City of Dallas v. Moreau 330 the court
upheld a claim of sovereign immunity for city officials who fired an employee
for violating rules of conduct governing city personnel. The court held that
the doctrine of governmental immunity shielded city activities performed as
part of the police power of the municipality. 331 Both the operation of the
city marshall's office and the hiring and firing of city employees are govern-
mental functions relating to a city's police power, and are not actionable in
Texas. 332
Dent v. City of Dallas 333 held that a police officer has no duty to arrest a
person even though probable cause would justify a detention.3 34 In Dent the
police declined to arrest a suspect accused of forgery and instead attempted
to follow him while waiting for assistance. A high speed chase resulted
when the suspect attempted to avoid arrest and Kathy Dent's husband died
when the suspect ran a stop sign and smashed into his automobile. The
court declined to fashion a rule that would have required the arrest of the
forger, and refused to involve the courts in the internal operations of police
activities. 335 Further, to impose liability in this situation would require po-
lice officers to ensure the results of high speed chases, a position contrary to
the great weight of authority. 336
328. Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, no writ); Baker v. Story, 621
S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
329. 733 S.W.2d at 227.
330. 718 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
331. Id. at 779.
332. Id. at 780.
333. 729 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
334. Id. at 116.
335. Id. at 117.
336. Id.
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